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I. INTRODUCTION 
By January 1956 the Montgomery Bus boycott was in full-
swing.  Black citizens in Montgomery, Alabama, were refusing to ride 
the city’s private buses to protest racially segregated seating.  At the 
midpoint of the twentieth century, protests against racial segregation 
in the South generally, and Montgomery specifically, raised serious 
and dangerous problems for Montgomery’s black community.1  The 
 
 * Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 ** Class of 2018, Boston University School of Law. 
 1. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History 
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1005–10 (1989).  White officials 
and business leaders in Montgomery were not happy about the bus boycott.  Predict-
ably, black leaders of the boycott “were threatened, and verbal intimidation was 
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bus boycott also presented practical concerns for African Americans 
living and working in Montgomery.  “To a largely uneducated people 
among whom the most common occupations were maid and day la-
borer, the loss of what was for many their most important modern con-
venience—cheap bus transportation—left them with staggering prob-
lems of logistics and morale.”2  The problems for the black community 
worsened when the Montgomery police commissioner threatened to 
arrest taxi drivers who charged black boycotters less than the minimum 
forty-five-cent fare.3  In response to this threat, the black community 
organized a car-pool system that would transport bus boycotters 
throughout the city.4  
On the afternoon of January 26, 1956, twenty-seven-year-old 
Martin Luther King Jr. had finished his day of work at the Dexter Av-
enue Baptist Church in Montgomery.5  On his drive home, King 
stopped his vehicle to offer a ride to a group of bus boycotters standing 
at a downtown car-pool location.6  After the boycotters entered King’s 
car, two motorcycle policemen pulled-in behind King’s vehicle.7  
While everyone in King’s car tried to remain calm, the police contin-
ued to follow King’s car.8  At the next car-pool location, when some 
of King’s passengers began to exit, one of the policemen pulled next 
to King’s window, stating:  “Get out, King.  You’re under arrest for 
speeding thirty miles an hour in a twenty-five-mile zone.”9  While 
stunned by the police action, King did not protest.  He was arrested and 
 
quickly superseded by potentially lethal force as bombs were detonated at the homes 
of [Martin Luther King Jr.] and [E.D.] Nixon,” an elder statesman of black civil rights 
activists in Montgomery.  Id. at 1027–28 (citations omitted). 
 2. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 
1954–63, at 145 (1988). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 160. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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taken to the Montgomery City Jail where he was processed, finger-
printed, and jailed with other black prisoners, including a school-
teacher who was also arrested during the bus boycott.10 
Even in 1956, stopping (and arresting) blacks for petty or non-
existent offenses had a long-standing pedigree.  In America, police tar-
geting blacks for arbitrary and disproportionate searches and seizures 
is a tradition as old as the nation itself.11  What happened to King is 
known as an investigatory or “pretext” stop.  The pretext for the stop 
was the commission of a traffic offense—allegedly driving thirty miles 
per hour in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone—but the real reason to 
stop and arrest King had nothing to do with the alleged speeding vio-
lation.  On the contrary, the Montgomery police wanted to intimidate 
King and send a message to Montgomery’s black community. 
It has been over sixty years since Martin Luther King Jr. was 
subjected to this arbitrary and discriminatory police practice.[JH: it has 
been more than sixty years since 1956]  Surely, things have changed 
in America.  After the demise of the Jim Crow system, the enactment 
of federal civil rights legislation protecting blacks from discriminatory 
application of state and local laws,12 as well as several decades of Su-
preme Court rulings enforcing the rights of black citizens,13 it would 
seem that law enforcement officials can no longer perform this type of 
arbitrary and bigoted policing. 
A. Pretext Stops in America   
Although much has changed in America, investigatory or pre-
text stops unfortunately remain ubiquitous.  As in King’s case, these 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND 
THE CAROLINAS 110 (2001) (citation omitted) (describing the laws that required black 
slaves who traveled beyond their homes to possess slave passes:  “Slave patrols fre-
quently looked at slave passes while making their rounds.  Laws required the slave to 
carry a pass, or ticket, from her master, which permitted the slave to leave the planta-
tion.  A specific pass stated the slave’s name, where she had permission to go, on 
what date, how long the pass was good for . . . and bore the owner’s signature.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). 
 13. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967); Browder v. Gayle, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
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stops are not aimed at enforcing the traffic code.  Rather, police “mak-
ing investigatory stops commonly have decided to carry out a criminal 
investigation before they make the stop; they then identify, or create, a 
pretext to justify the stop.”14  Put differently, a pretext stop is a police 
practice “where the intent is not to sanction a driving violation but to 
look for evidence of more serious criminal wrongdoing.”15  Various 
types of law enforcement agencies utilize pretext stops, and high-rank-
ing police officials endorse pretext stops as a crime control measure.16  
Indeed, over two decades ago investigatory stops were given a major 
boost when the federal government actively encouraged state and local 
police departments to use traffic laws as a basis for stopping cars sus-
pected of drug smuggling.17 
 
 14. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE 
AND CITIZENSHIP 59 (2014); id. at 8 (“The investigatory stop is made not to enforce 
traffic laws or vehicle codes but to investigate the driver.  Is this driver carrying a gun 
or illegal drugs?  What is he up to?  Why is he in this neighborhood?  Is there a warrant 
for his arrest?”).  Because police cannot conduct a stop without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of a crime or traffic violation, “most investigatory stops are 
nominally justified by minor violations.”  Id.   
 15. Id. at 30.  A traffic code is well suited for pretext stops because police 
“may manipulate [the traffic laws] ‘to justify detention and interrogation of persons 
suspected of more serious crimes.’”  Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
129, 157 n.126 (2017) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE 
A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 87–88 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965)).  When used in this 
manner, the traffic code is the equivalent of a vague statute.  Id.; see also LAFAVE, 
supra, at 87–89 (noting that police use vague laws as pretext to investigate suspicious 
persons). 
 16. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 10 (“Although police departments differ in 
many ways—big cities versus small towns, urban departments versus state highway 
patrol agencies, traditional versus progressive agencies—the investigatory stop has 
spread widely among these agencies.”); id. at 12 (citation omitted) (“Police officers 
particularly believe that investigatory stops are among their most effective tools for 
finding and arresting criminals and preventing crimes.  In many departments, very 
large proportions of all arrests are made in ‘routine’ investigatory traffic stops.”).  
Even after racial profiling became politically unacceptable in the 1990s, “every offi-
cial condemnation of racial profiling by the leaders of professional policing was ac-
companied in its official text by a full-throated defense of investigatory stops.”  Id. at 
49 (citation omitted). 
 17. See EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 27 (noting that pretext stops were revived 
and encouraged, in part, through “research by policing scholars claiming that investi-
gatory stops were among professional policing’s most effective crime-fighting tools,” 
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When discussing police stops it is important to distinguish be-
tween pretext stops, which are fishing expeditions for criminality, and 
ordinary traffic stops, which are performed to genuinely enforce the 
traffic code or to promote traffic safety.  During ordinary traffic stops, 
“officers’ discretionary choices are focused on traffic-law viola-
tions.”18  A pretext stop is a very different police tactic:  “The distinc-
tion between traffic-safety and investigatory stops is the key to sorting 
out how and when race matters in police stops.”19  
 
and the “development of remarkably detailed knowledge about how, tactically, to ef-
fectively carry out these stops;  Gary Webb, DWB [Driving While Black], ESQUIRE, 
Apr. 1999, at 118,C reprinted in ESQUIRE, Jan. 29, 2007, https://www.es-
quire.com/news-politics/a1223/driving-while-black-0499/ (describing Operation 
Pipeline, which was the federal program designed to identify drug couriers on the 
nation’s highways).[JH: per BB 1.4 books should come first]  This body of knowledge 
grew out of the federal government’s war on drugs and the police training provided 
as part of that initiative, which spread ideas about how to carry out investigatory stops 
so as to discover contraband in vehicles.  This research and the accompanying im-
provements in stop tactics and training convinced police leaders that investigatory 
stops were an effective strategy.”). 
     Although he did not invent the pretext traffic stop, Bob Vogel, a former Florida 
State Trooper and later the sheriff of Volusia County, Florida, helped perfect the prac-
tice as we know it today.  As Professor David Harris details in his book PROFILES IN 
INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002), Vogel began making a 
name for himself and pretext stops by conducting several successful drug busts by 
stopping drivers on Interstate 95 in Florida between February 1984 and March 1985.  
Id. at 22.  According to Vogel, he amassed “a list of . . . ‘cumulative similarities’—
Vogel prefers not to use the word profile”—in drivers who possessed drugs.  Id.  Vo-
gel then used these characteristics when deciding which drivers to stop.  Id.  Initially, 
courts were skeptical of Vogel’s technique and found some of his stops violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 22–23 (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th 
Cir. 1986)).  “But Vogel soon discovered a way around these problems.  Instead of 
using the similarities themselves as the legal justification for the stop, Vogel began 
stating that the traffic offense was the reason he stopped the car.”  Id. at 23.  Vogel 
went on to “conduct[] training classes for the DEA’s Operation Pipeline.”  Id. at 22; 
see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.3, at 470 n.2 (5th ed. 2012); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling 
and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 170 n.25 (describing how “[t]he 
federal government has strongly encouraged state and local law enforcement officers 
to view the highway as a battleground in the war on drugs,” referencing Operation 
Pipeline). 
 18. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 53. 
 19. Id. at 59. 
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From one perspective, the use of pretext stops in the War on 
Drugs specifically, and to fight crime generally, raises no legal alarm.  
For most white Americans, modern application of this practice may 
seem annoying but it is worth the cost in the fight against crime:  A 
motorist is stopped by the police.  The officer then questions the mo-
torist about his or her travel plans (and if there are passengers, they are 
also questioned).  Finally, a traffic summons or ticket may be issued.  
While bothersome, this practice, viewed in the aggregate, does not 
amount to a constitutional crisis.  Moreover, on rare occasion, crimi-
nality is exposed as a result of the stop.20 
Black Americans, however, have a distinctly different percep-
tion of the situation.  For King, the pretext stop was much more than a 
“stop.”21  The upshot was a frightening ride to jail:  At one point during 
the ride, “[p]anic seized” King because he believed the police were 
going to lynch him.22  Today, the modern pretext stop is on display 
when a black motorist is seen standing on the side of a highway or city 
street while police—typically white officers—search his vehicle.  
 
 20. The public’s perception of the consequences of pretext stops is distorted.  
Local news outlets will occasionally highlight the major drug bust or discovery of 
weapons during a traffic stop.  Rarely, however, does local news media describe the 
many innocent persons who are stopped and searched but no evidence of criminality 
is discovered.  Likewise: 
Judges see only cases in which stops and searches yield illegal drugs 
or illegal guns.  They typically conclude that the harm to a driver 
who is found with illegal drugs was outweighed by the benefits of 
reducing crime.  Judges do not see the many more stops and searches 
that yield no drugs or guns, and they rarely ask whether these stops 
harm the innocent, who are subjected to intrusive questions, 
searches, handcuffing, and worse.  Even the police, those closest to 
the stop, rarely consider the possibility that investigatory stops may 
cause deep and lasting harm. 
Id. at 134. 
 21. Although the arrest of King for a speeding violation was obviously pre-
textual, under the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
the arrest was constitutional.  See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (inter-
preting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which ruled that pretextual traf-
fic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as also controlling the constitution-
ality of pretextual arrests). 
 22. BRANCH, supra note 2, at 160. 
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Study after study has demonstrated that African Americans are tar-
geted for pretext stops at a rate greater than white Americans: 
     The investigatory stop is why blacks are stopped at 
much higher rates than whites and why police pursue in-
trusive lines of questioning and searches more com-
monly in stops of blacks than of whites.  While whites 
mainly experience conventional traffic-safety stops, ra-
cial minorities—blacks especially—commonly experi-
ence investigatory stops. . . .  This racial difference in 
police practices and people’s lived experience and 
shared knowledge of these practices is why black people 
commonly rate stops that they have experienced as un-
fair, while whites are generally more sanguine about 
stops that they have experienced.  It is a key reason why, 
compared to whites, African Americans so distrust the 
police.23 
For blacks, particularly black men, a pretext stop is unequivocal notice 
of their inferior status in America.  As Don Jackson, a former police 
officer, put it not too long ago:  “The black American finds that the 
most prominent reminder of his second-class citizenship are the po-
lice.”24  
Surely, some must be thinking that Jackson exaggerates.  Not 
so.  Jackson’s words were prompted, in part, by what happened to him 
at the hands of police.  On January 14, 1989, Jackson, a former police 
officer from Hawthorne, California, attempted to document that Long 
Beach, California police were targeting and harassing minority citizens 
who lived in and visited Long Beach.  Jackson and a companion were 
stopped (ironically) while driving along Martin Luther King Boule-
vard.  When Jackson asked the police why he was stopped, an officer 
pushed Jackson through a plate-glass store window.  Unknown to the 
police, an NBC camera crew filmed the entire incident.25  What hap-
pened to Jackson is experienced by thousands of black motorists 
 
 23. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 8. 
 24. Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism to My People, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
1989, at A25. 
 25. Bill Girdner, Charge of Racism by California Police Is Latest in Long 
Line, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1989. 
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yearly, with lesser or greater consequences.  Further, empirical studies 
show that other blacks share Don Jackson’s view of the police.  Even 
when officers are polite during pretext stops, blacks describe “fear and 
resentment of the experience.”26  White drivers, by contrast, are not 
routinely targeted for this practice.  Thus, the ultimate problem is not 
racist police officers, or even rude behavior by police during investi-
gatory stops:  “What makes inquisitive police stops so offensive to so 
many African Americans and Latinos is not that the officers carrying 
them out are impolite or even frankly bigoted, but that these stops are 
common, repeated, routine, and even scripted.”27 
B. Pretext Stops and the Fourth Amendment 
No doubt, many readers must be thinking that the Constitution 
has something to say about pretext stops.28  What we have described 
is arbitrary and discriminatory police behavior.  For a nation that is 
rightly proud of some of its constitutional heritage, pretext stops 
should be an anathema.  The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, should 
presumably bar pretext stops.  Whenever the police stop or “pull over” 
a motorist for a traffic offense, they have seized that motorist within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.29  Why are pretext stops “rea-
sonable”?  Why are police acting reasonably when they stop a vehicle 
 
 26. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 2. 
 27. Id. at 6. 
 28. Cf. Eric F. Citron, Note, Right and Responsibility in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence: The Problem with Pretext, 116 YALE L.J. 1072, 1074 (2007) (“There 
[is] something about this kind of police mindset—this liberated space for bad inten-
tions—that should give the individual citizen both a moment of pause and the hope, 
perhaps, that the Constitution forbids this form of roving pretextual surveillance.”); 
id. at 1114 (“We, as a citizenry, should be concerned with pretext on the part of the 
police because, perhaps more than anything else, pretext indicates that it may not be 
appropriate to trust them to responsibly discharge the powers we have granted them 
for the ends that these powers were intended to serve.  Indeed, pretext ought to be a 
core problem for the Fourth Amendment because it represents a breach of trust.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 29. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007) (finding that in addition 
to seizing the driver, a traffic stop also effectuates a seizure of the passenger); Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stating that because a random stop of a 
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to investigate a traffic offense, when their actual reason for the stop is 
not supported by probable cause?  During the founding era of America, 
James Otis Jr. stirred revolutionary fervor when he rallied against the 
British’s use of writs of assistance to search the homes and businesses 
of colonists living in Massachusetts.30  Otis told a British court that the 
writs afforded “a power that places the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer.”31  That’s exactly what pretext stops al-
low.32  They allow officers to pick and choose who to stop and ques-
tion.  
Under normal circumstances, Montgomery police would not 
have arrested a white pastor for driving thirty miles an hour in a 
twenty-five mile-per-hour zone.  Martin Luther King Jr., however, was 
arrested and jailed.  Race mattered.  Likewise, many of the pretext 
stops currently conducted on America’s roads and highways would not 
occur but for the police’s desire to discover illegal narcotics, guns, or 
other evidence of crime.  “It is the fact of the departure from the ac-
cepted way of handling such cases that makes the officer’s conduct 
arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness that in this context constitutes the 
Fourth Amendment violation . . . .”33  Nor is the constitutional evil 
 
motorist is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, police must have probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion that the motorist committed a traffic offense or other crime).   
 30. See 2 JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 139–42 (L. Kinvin 
Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). 
 31. Id. at 141–42. 
 32. Cf. Citron, supra note 28, at 1108 (“The principal problem with the Whren 
[v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (ruling that pretext stops do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment)] rule is that it transmogrifies the traffic law into the twenty-first 
century equivalent of the general warrant—police can stop whomever they want on 
the road, and for whatever reason, as long as they can claim probable cause to suspect 
some minor, technical violation of the traffic laws.”); see also Barbara C. Salken, The 
General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Un-
checked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 224 (1989) 
(“[T]he authority to arrest for a traffic offense creates power to search tantamount to 
the unlimited and arbitrary authority that led to the adoption of the [F]ourth [A]mend-
ment.”). 
 33. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 170;[JH: this can be short cite ac-
cording to BB 4.2] Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 366 (1974) (citation omitted) (ascribing to the Framers of the 
Fourth Amendment “not merely an appreciation but a concern that one evil of the 
existence of arbitrary power is the inevitability of its discriminatory exercise.”). 
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eliminated by the requirement that police have probable cause of a traf-
fic offense before they are permitted to stop a vehicle:  “[G]iven the 
pervasiveness of such minor offenses and the ease with which law en-
forcement agents may uncover them in the conduct of virtually every-
one, that difference hardly matters . . . .”34   
Finally, in the rare case where probable cause or other objective 
evidence of a traffic violation is lacking, an officer can always “fabri-
cate” probable cause.35  In modern times, this practice is known as 
“testilying.”36  These practices seem to contradict the Supreme Court’s 
 
 34. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 173; see also Bowers, supra note 15, 
at 155 (“In petty public-order cases, probable cause merely translates to a troubling 
form of ‘constitutional carte blanche’—a plenary authority to harass and humiliate, 
to constrain and coerce, to behave in a manner antithetical to the purpose of the legal-
ity principle ‘as an important prophylaxis against the arbitrary and abusive exercise 
of discretion in the enforcement of the penal law.’”) (citations omitted). 
 35. The classic description of this phenomenon was provided by Jerome 
Skolnick: 
[T]he policeman perceives his job not simply as requiring that he 
arrest where he finds probable cause.  In addition, he sees the need 
to be able to reconstruct a set of complex happenings in such a way 
that, subsequent to the arrest, probable cause can be found according 
to appellate court standards.  In this way, as one district attorney ex-
pressed it, “the policeman fabricates probable cause.”  By saying 
this, he did not mean to assert that the policeman is a liar, but rather 
that he finds it necessary to construct an ex post facto description of 
the proceeding events so that [they can] conform to legal arrest re-
quirements, whether in fact the events actually did so or not at the 
time of the arrest.  Thus, the policeman respects the necessity for 
“complying” with the arrest laws.  His “compliance,” however, may 
take the form of post hoc manipulation of the facts rather than be-
fore-the-fact behavior.  Again, this generalization does not apply in 
all cases. . . .  But when he sees the case law as a hindrance to his 
primary task of apprehending criminals, he usually attempts to con-
struct the appearance of compliance, rather than allow the offender 
to escape apprehension. 
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 214–15 (2d ed. 1975).   
 36. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do 
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996); Joseph Goldstein, Police ‘Testilying’ Re-
mains a Problem. Here Is How the Criminal Justice System Could Reduce It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/nyregion/police-lying-new-
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frequent pronouncements that “the ‘core,’ ‘basic purpose’ and ‘central 
concern’ of the Fourth Amendment have to do with protecting liberty 
and privacy against arbitrary governmental interference.”37  Put an-
other way, precedent tells us that pretext traffic stops should be forbid-
den under the Fourth Amendment. 
Sadly, but not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of the United 
States came to the opposite conclusion.  In a unanimous opinion, 
Whren v. United States held that whenever police have probable cause 
to believe that a motorist has violated a traffic law, a stop is constitu-
tionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.38  The subjective in-
tent or motivation of the police, including police motives based on ra-
cial stereotypes or bias, are constitutionally irrelevant.39  The only 
thing that mattered to the Court was the existence of probable cause 
that a traffic violation occurred.  Speaking for the Justices, Justice 
Scalia explained:  “For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is, 
we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law 
rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”40  
II.  THE IMPACT OF WHREN V. UNITED STATES 
The facts of Whren occurred on June 10, 1993, when two plain-
clothes vice-squad officers, Ephraim Soto Jr. and Homer Littlejohn, 
were patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington, D.C.41  The officers 
observed two young black men, Michael Whren and James Brown, 
riding in a Nissan Pathfinder with temporary tags.42  The officers were 
suspicious of the Pathfinder because it waited at a stop sign for over 
 
york.html; Joseph Goldstein, Promotions, Not Punishments, for Officers Accused of 
Lying, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/nyregion/new-
york-police-perjury-promotions.html; Joseph Goldstein, ‘Testilying’ by Police: A 
Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyre-
gion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html.   
 37. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 186 (citations omitted). 
 38. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 39. Id. at 813 (stating that prior precedents “foreclose any argument that the 
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the 
individual officers involved”). 
 40. Id. at 819. 
 41. Id. at 808.   
 42. Id. 
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twenty seconds, which they deemed too long.43  They also claimed to 
have observed Brown, the driver, look into Whren’s lap.44  The officers 
initiated the traffic stop because the pause at the stop sign violated a 
D.C. traffic regulation that requires drivers to pay “full time and atten-
tion” to their vehicle while driving.45  The officers made a U-turn to 
stop the car, at which point Brown allegedly turned right without sig-
naling and sped off.46  
Even though a D.C. police department regulation prohibited 
plainclothes vice officers—like Soto and Littlejohn—from making 
routine traffic stops unless they observed a violation “so grave as to 
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others,”47 they nonetheless 
stopped the Pathfinder.48  “The reason for the stop was obviously pre-
text.”49  As soon as Soto approached the driver’s side of the car, he 
observed what appeared to be two plastic bags of crack cocaine.50  
Brown and Whren were arrested and the vehicle was searched, recov-
ering more narcotics.51  
Brown and Whren were indicted on federal drug offenses.52  
During pre-trial motions, they argued that the legality of a traffic stop 
should not turn on whether a reasonable officer could conduct a stop, 
but whether a reasonable officer would conduct a stop.53  And no rea-
sonable plainclothes vice officer would have made this stop because it 
was barred by departmental regulations.54  But the lower courts re-
jected the defendants’ Fourth Amendment challenge that the stop was 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 810. 
 46. Id. at 808.  
 47. Id. at 815. 
 48. Id. at 808, 815.  
 49. Bowers, supra note 15, at 156. 
 50. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09.  
 51. Id. at 809.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 809–10. 
 54. It comes as no surprise that the officers were apparently not disciplined for 
violating departmental rules.  See Kevin R. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same: 
The Story of Whren v. United States, in RACE LAW STORIES 419, 439 (Rachel F. Mo-
ran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) (“Nothing appears to have come of the fact that 
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unconstitutional, stating that the officers acted in accordance with a 
normal traffic stop, even though department regulation prohibited such 
stops.55  
In the Supreme Court, racial profiling was a central plank of the 
defendants’ constitutional claim.  Emphasizing the lack of objective 
evidence that Brown and Whren were involved in narcotics activities, 
the defendants argued that they were stopped because of their race.56  
They told the Court that racially-biased traffic enforcement was wide-
spread throughout the country.57  Indeed, the year the Court decided 
Whren, court cases and other reports indicated that black motorists 
were targeted for pretextual traffic stops in various jurisdictions.  For 
example, a New Jersey trial court found that New Jersey State Troop-
ers had a de facto police practice of targeting black motorists for in-
vestigations and arrests on the southern portion of the New Jersey 
Turnpike.58  In North Carolina, an analysis of the 1995 patrol records 
of the Special Emphasis Team of the North Carolina Highway Patrol, 
whose goal was to interdict narcotics through traffic stops on Inter-
states 85 and 95, found that officers on the Special Emphasis Team 
“charged black male drivers [with traffic offenses] at nearly twice the 
rate of other troopers working the same roads.”59  The study found that 
black male drivers received almost 45% of the traffic citations issued 
by the Team, while black male drivers received only 24.2% of the traf-
fic citations issued by other North Carolina troopers patrolling the 
same highways.60  Moreover, the study explained that an independent 
statistical expert believed that it was “wildly improbable” that two 
groups of troopers patrolling the same roads would produce such dis-
parate results by chance.61  In their argument to the Court, the defend-
 
[the officers] . . . violat[ed] departmental regulations.  Both officers continued serving 
on the vice squad for many years.”).  
 55. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. 
 56. Id. at 810. 
 57. Id.  
 58. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
 59. Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Highway Drug Unit Focuses on Blacks, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 28, 1996, at A1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Could It Happen by Chance?, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 28, 1996, at A17. 
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ants in Whren insisted that if a traffic violation always justifies stop-
ping a motorist, police will abuse their power and use traffic offenses 
to evade otherwise applicable Fourth Amendment safeguards that pre-
vent stopping and questioning motorists unless police have probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in criminal 
conduct.62  
As mentioned above, none of this evidence or legal argument 
persuaded the Justices to declare pretext stops unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  In fact, the Court was quite dismissive of the de-
fendants’ constitutional arguments.  After Whren, a vehicle stop is le-
gal provided an officer can identify any traffic offense or minor viola-
tion of the law—no matter the officer’s real reason for the stop.  The 
result and message in Whren were not lost on law enforcement offi-
cials.  Writing in Police Chief Magazine, which describes itself as the 
professional voice of law enforcement, Roy Caldwell Kime recognized 
the importance of the case and the fact that pretext stops are a staple of 
law enforcement procedure.63  Kime noted that had Whren been de-
cided differently, “a major shift in the way crimes are investigated and 
prosecuted in the United States would have occurred.”64  Instead, ac-
cording to Kime, the result in Whren “preserve[d]” the way police “use 
traffic stops to uncover other criminal activities.”65  The message to 
police was clear.  As one instructor for the California Highway Patrol 
told another author:  “After Whren . . . the game was over.  We won.”66 
On the other hand, Professor Wayne R. LaFave, the nation’s 
foremost scholar on the Fourth Amendment, noted that the Whren 
Court’s analysis of its own precedents was, “to put it mildly, quite dis-
appointing.”67  According to LaFave, Whren “managed to trivialize 
 
 62. Whren, 517 U.S. at 816–18. 
 63. Roy Caldwell Kime, U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Asset Forfeiture and 
Traffic Stop Evidence, POLICE CHIEF, Aug. 1996, at 10. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  The Police Chief article made no mention of the racial disparities gen-
erated by pretext stops. 
 66. Webb, supra note 17, at 127; cf. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 159 (com-
menting that the “technical requirement to have a lawful justification for a stop offers 
no meaningful limitation on officers’ authority to make stops”).[JH: should be the 
same citation sentence BB 1.2 and 1.3] 
 67. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 193. 
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what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a pervasive 
law enforcement practice.”68  When this assessment is combined with 
the fact that the upshot of Whren means that police are conferred with 
“virtual carte blanche to stop people because of the color of their skin 
or for any other arbitrary reason,”69 Whren ranks as one of the Court’s 
worst opinions in the last thirty years and is deserving of the vast crit-
icism it has received. 
Over twenty years ago, one of us criticized the result in 
Whren.70  Indeed, condemnation of Whren’s holding and reasoning has 
been widespread and continues unabated.71  While there are no signs 
that the current Court sees any reason to question, let alone reconsider, 
its holding in Whren, the ramifications of Whren are significant.72  
“More than 20 million Americans are stopped each year for traffic vi-
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 1.4(e), at 171 (citation omitted). 
 70. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 
(1998); see also Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment 
Problem with Pretextual Traffic Stops, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE 
REHNQUIST COURT 90–101 (Michael Avery ed., 2009). 
 71. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 176 n.86 (citing articles criticiz-
ing Whren); see id. at 187 n.126 (citing cases and articles discussing the use of race 
by police in drug courier profiles and in the enforcement of traffic laws). 
 72. Recently, Justice Ginsburg, who joined the Whren opinion without quali-
fication, acknowledged the criticism Whren has generated.  See District of Columbia 
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 593–94 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  She also stated 
that, “I would leave open, for reexamination in a future case, whether a police of-
ficer’s reason for acting, in at least some circumstances, should factor into the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry.”  Id. (emphasis added).  While Justice Ginsburg’s statement in-
dicates that some members of the Court are aware of the criticism heaped on Whren, 
her statement does not repudiate, let alone call for a reconsideration, of Whren.  A 
case filed in the 2017–2018 Term would have given the Court an opportunity to do 
so.  See United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 
No. 17-1349, 2018 WL 1470947 (Oct. 1, 2018) (asking the Court to decide whether 
the Fourth Amendment forbids a pretextual seizure of a motorist based solely on prob-
able cause to suspect a civil parking infraction). 
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olations, making this one of the most common ways in which the pub-
lic interacts with the police.”73  All motorists violate traffic codes fre-
quently and with regularity.74  When this fact is combined with the 
knowledge that numerous studies demonstrate that racial minorities are 
stopped at higher rates than white motorists,75 the consequence is that 
“[l]aw enforcement becomes a matter of ‘picking the man and then 
searching the law books . . . to pin some offense on him.’”76  
Further, there is another, deadly, aspect of pretextual traffic 
stops that we have not previously highlighted and has been ignored by 
the Court but is no less deserving of the nation’s attention.  Pretext 
stops cause “problems for real people with real names,” are “hardly 
 
 73. EMMA PIERSON ET AL., A LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 
IN POLICE STOPS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 1 (June 18, 2017), 
https://5harad.com/papers/traffic-stops.pdf. 
 74. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 31 (stating that the consequence of the nation’s 
many traffic laws means that “no driver can go for even a short drive without violating 
some aspect of the traffic code.  And since there are no perfect drivers, everyone’s a 
violator.”); Bowers, supra note 15, at 151 (“Indeed, the overwhelming majority of 
motorists break vehicle and traffic laws on an almost daily basis.”). 
 75. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 26 (“Police stop and search racial minorities 
at disproportionately high rates, and these disparities have grown wider in recent 
years.”); HARRIS, supra note 17, at 72 (“The data on stops are incontrovertible.  The 
information comes from many cities and involves many different police departments 
and law enforcement contexts. . . .  [A]ll of the data point in the same direction:  mi-
norities are stopped, questioned, and searched in numbers far out of proportion to 
their presence in the driving population.”). 
 76. Bowers, supra note 15, at 156; see also PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: 
POLICING BLACK MEN 59–60 (2017): 
A cop friend of mine invented a game that tells you everything you 
need to know about the extraordinary consequences of Whren.  The 
cop takes my law students on ride-alongs in his squad car so they 
can see what it’s like to be a police officer.  The game is called Pick 
a Car.  My friend tells the students to pick any car they see on the 
street and he will legally stop it.  He says that he can follow any 
driver and within a few blocks he or she will commit some traffic 
infraction.  Then he turns on his siren and flashing lights.  He can 
order the driver and passenger to exit their vehicle.  He can pat them 
down if he feels like his safety is threatened.  This gives him an enor-
mous amount of power.  As a practical matter, if you are driving a 
car, he can stop you at will. 
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trivial and anything but hypothetical,” 77 and sometimes fatal.  This 
lethal phenomenon is evident when we recall recent events and the 
names of black motorists stopped for trivial traffic violations and then 
killed by police:  Philando Castile was pulled over for a cracked tail 
light.  Sandra Bland was pulled over for failing to use a turn signal 
when changing lanes.  Walter Scott was pulled over for a broken brake 
light.  Castile, Bland, and Scott would not live to challenge the police 
decision to stop them.  
Philado Castile was a black thirty-two-year-old school cafeteria 
worker when he was pulled over by police officer Jeronimo Yanez in 
Falcon Heights, Minnesota, on July 6, 2016, allegedly for a cracked 
tail light.78  This wasn’t Philando’s first traffic stop.  “In a 13-year 
span, Philando Castile was pulled over by police in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul region at least 49 times, an average of about once every three 
months, often for minor infractions.”79  Philando’s girlfriend, Diamond 
Reynolds, who was in the passenger seat, says that when Officer Yanez 
approached the vehicle, Philando tried to tell him that he was carrying 
a gun with a legal permit.80  Philando was reaching for his identifica-
tion when Officer Yanez shot him several times, killing him while Di-
amond and Philando’s four-year-old daughter watched.81  A video 
posted by Diamond of the incident went viral on a number of social 
media platforms.82  
Walter Scott was fifty-years-old when North Charleston police 
officer Michael Slager stopped him.  After telling Scott that he was 
stopped because his brake light was out, Slager returned to his cruiser 
 
 77. Bowers, supra note 15, at 140. 
 78. Sharon LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was Pulled Over 49 
Times in 13 Years, Often for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/before-philando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-
costly-trail-of-minor-traffic-stops.html.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile 
Said About the Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-who-shot-
philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?utm_term=.aab9778a62d3. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200528 
2018 1105 Maclin Reconcile WLR Clean Copy  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  11:13 
AM 
118 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 48 
to check Scott’s identification.83  A few minutes later, Scott exited his 
vehicle and began to run away from the scene.84  Cell phone footage 
taken from a bystander shows Slager shooting Scott five times in the 
back, just “for running away, simply for having a broken taillight.”85  
In December 2017, Slager was sentenced to twenty years for murder-
ing Walter Scott.86  
And then there is the tragic and mysterious death of Sandra 
Bland in July 2015.  The day after an interview with Prairie View 
A&M University in Texas, Bland was stopped by Texas State Trooper 
Brian Encinia.87  Encinia claims he stopped Bland for changing lanes 
without using a turn signal.88  Dash camera footage of the incident re-
veals that a back-and-forth ensued between Bland and Encinia after 
Encinia asked her to put out her cigarette, which she refused.89  Bland 
was eventually ordered from the vehicle, slammed to the pavement, 
handcuffed, and arrested.90  “One might respond that there was . . . no 
need for Bland to lash out—that she mocked him, just as he mocked 
her.  But only one of them was a professional.  More to the point, only 
one of them had the law at his back.”91  Encinia arrested Bland, who 
was later charged with assaulting a public servant.92  Three days later, 
 
 83. See Meridith Edwards & Dakin Andone, Ex-South Carolina Cop Michael 
Slager Gets 20 Years for Walter Scott Killing, CNN (Dec. 7, 2017) 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentencing/index.html.  
 84. Id.   
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Bowers, supra note 15, at 179. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 180–81 for a revealing transcript of the exchange between Bland 
and Encinia. 
 90. Id. at 181–82. 
 91. Id. at 182. 
 92. Id. 
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Bland was found dead in her jail cell; the cause of death was deter-
mined suicide by asphyxiation.93  In September 2016, Bland’s family 
settled for close to $2 million in a wrongful death suit.94 
While some readers may strongly disagree with this assessment, 
we believe Whren’s holding contributed to the deaths of Castile, Scott, 
and Bland.  Perhaps Whren does not encourage police to target blacks 
for traffic enforcement, but it certainly erects no constitutional obsta-
cles to arbitrary and biased policing.95  Recall the reaction to Whren 
from the instructor for the California Highway Patrol:  “After 
Whren . . . the game was over.[JH: ellipses shouldn’t end the line]  We 
won.”96  This instructor meant that Whren blessed pretext stops, not-
withstanding the arbitrary and discriminatory impact caused by such 
stops.  Nationwide, police have grasped the authority given by Whren 
and used it as a tool to perform arbitrary seizures to troll for evidence 
of criminality despite lacking objective evidence for their investiga-
 
 93. Id.; see also Debbie Nathan, What Happened to Sandra Bland?, THE 
NATION (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/what-happened-to-san-
dra-bland/. 
 94. Mark Berman, Sandra Bland’s Family Says They Reached a $1.9 Million 




 95. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: 
The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 129 
(2017) (“The claim that the Court enables and sometimes expressly authorizes racial 
profiling might sound like hyperbole, but it is not.”).  Concededly, Whren agreed with 
the defendants’ claim that selectively targeting blacks for traffic enforcement was un-
constitutional and suggested a constitutional claim against race-based enforcement of 
traffic laws would be available under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).  For too many 
reasons to list here, this suggestion should not be taken seriously.  See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE, 
supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 189–92; Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, supra 
note 70, at 337 n.22; David Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Fu-
ture of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.  271, 326. 
 96. Webb, supra note 17, at 127. 
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tions and intrusions.  When seen from this angle, the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Constitution becomes a sword for the police rather than a 
shield for the individual.97 
Ultimately, the authority given by Whren facilitates part of the 
bias contaminating America’s criminal justice system.98  It promotes 
arbitrary and racist policing.  Although he was not focusing solely on 
the problem of pretextual traffic stops, what Paul Butler said about how 
America’s law enforcement officers enforce the nation’s criminal 
codes captures the essence of our attack on Whren: 
     The problem is the criminal process itself.  Cops rou-
tinely hurt and humiliate black people because that is 
what they are paid to do.  Virtually every objective in-
vestigation of a U.S. law enforcement agency finds that 
the police, as policy, treat African Americans with con-
tempt.  In New York, Baltimore, Ferguson, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Cleveland, San Francisco, and many other cit-
ies, the U.S. Justice Department and federal courts have 
stated that the official practices of police departments in-
clude violating the rights of African Americans.  The po-
lice kill, wound, pepper spray, beat up, detain, frisk, 
handcuff, and use dogs against blacks in circumstances 
in which they do not do the same to white people.99 
Even the most privileged (and innocent) black Americans can-
not escape the humiliation of being stopped, told to exit their vehicle, 
 
 97. Cf. DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: HOW OUR SEARCH 
FOR SAFETY INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 41 (2011) (describing reliance on the reasona-
ble suspicion standard rather than the probable cause standard contained in a memo 
for a special unit of the Washington, D.C., police department that uses traffic stops to 
look for guns:  “For too long police officers have been trained to view the Constitution 
of the United States and its judicial interpretations as placing rigid restrictions on what 
law enforcement personnel can do on the street while shielding criminals from detec-
tion. . . .  The members of the . . . Gun Recovery Unit have viewed the Constitution 
and its associated case law as a law enforcement sword rather than a shield.”). 
 98. See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
IN BLACK AMERICA 197–215 (2017) (describing how pretext stops contribute to racial 
disparities in America’s criminal justice system). 
 99. BUTLER, supra note 76, at 2–3 (citations omitted). 
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and placed in handcuffs, or of having their hands put on the hood of a 
vehicle and being frisked for weapons.100  No person of color is im-
mune.101  This reality teaches us that “there is plenty of fear to go 
around.”102  Police fear black men because they associate blacks with 
violence and criminality.103  At the same time, black men do not trust 
the police.  “Even black men who share no other problem with the 
black underclass share this one.  The most successful, respectable 
 
 100. See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND 
REDEMPTION 38–44 (2014) (detailing the author’s account of an evening sitting in his 
car listening to music outside of his midtown Atlanta apartment when two officers 
approached his vehicle.  Stevenson got out of his car to enter his apartment when 
officers drew their weapons and yelled “[m]ove and I’ll blow your head off,” worried 
Stevenson may be a suspected burglar in the area); see also Devon W. Carbado, 
(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953–64 (2002) (providing 
examples where Carbado recounts a number of his first interactions with police after 
moving to the United States from the United Kingdom).  For poor blacks living in 
urban areas, the experience is worse and routine.  See SHIPLER, supra note 97, at 55–
63, 65–71, 83–84 (describing police encounters while riding with a Gun Unit of the 
D.C. police department): 
     Most citizens who are searched without giving voluntary consent 
don’t go to court for the simple reason that they are entirely inno-
cent. . . .  [T]heir experiences add up to an invisible record across the 
United States of countless unconstitutional searches.  Each night, the 
[Gun Unit] leaves dozens of such victims in its wake.  Rushing 
through blocks and courtyards, the officers consider the entire shift 
a success if a single gun is found, even when numerous innocents 
are stopped and frisked, their cars searched, their dignity assaulted, 
their zones of privacy invaded for naught. . . .  But the officers don’t 
keep track of the fruitless searches, and neither does anyone else. 
Id. at 66. 
 101. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58–59, https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/1995/10/23/thirteen-ways-of-looking-at-a-black-man (“There’s a moving viola-
tion that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.:  Driving While Black.”). 
 102. Bowers, supra note 15, at 172. 
 103. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION 
AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 170 (1988) (“[T]he patrolman said he investigated 
the car in the first place because there were blacks in it, and with blacks ‘there is 
always a greater chance of something wrong.’”); EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 42 
(citation omitted) (“Of the various social pathologies attributed to blacks, one directly 
implicates the police:  the enduring stereotype that blacks are more likely to be vio-
lent, aggressive, and engage in crime.”);.  
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black man can find himself in a one-sided confrontation with a cop 
who thinks his first name is ‘Nigger’ and his last name is ‘Boy.’”104  
This distrust is manifested in African Americans’ attitudes toward po-
lice pretext stops.  “[B]lacks believe that the police are constantly 
watching them and treat them as if they don’t belong; blacks fear that 
every small offense will result in a stop and that every encounter with 
the police can escalate and turn ugly.”105 
The result of this mix of police attitude towards blacks and 
blacks’ distrust of the police is predictable:  While officers “anticipate 
the possibility of violence, however remote, during a police stop, black 
drivers fear that any encounter with the police can, based [on] an inad-
vertent action or remark or misunderstanding, escalate into a humiliat-
ing and threatening experience.”106  White Americans do not view po-
lice stops as ominous, or as a statement about their status as a citizen, 
or, most importantly, as life threatening.  “[F]or whites[,] a stop is just 
a stop.”107  Not so for blacks.  The only thing “normal” or routine about 
traffic stops “is the constant possibility of intrusive questions and 
searches, and the implication that the driver looks like a criminal.”108 
There is another imbalance associated with police stops that is 
rarely publicly discussed.  When police confrontations with black driv-
 
 104. Don Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1987, at E22, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/08/opinion/the-editorial-notebook-blacks-and-
blue-power.html. 
 105. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 47 (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 48; see also id. at 138: 
     Although white drivers do not like being stopped by the police, 
their dislike is fundamentally different than African Americans’ fear 
of investigatory stops and searches, and it has different implications 
for whites’ sense of their place in society.  No white driver told us 
that he feared police stops.  No white driver told us that she feared 
what might transpire during police stops—of searches, handcuffing, 
and arrest.  No white driver told us that he tried to teach his children 
how to avoid trouble in police stops. 
 108. Id. at 118. 
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ers go bad or become deadly, “only the officer may rely upon his emo-
tions and errors to claim an ex post excuse.”109  If a black driver or 
passenger makes an innocent mistake, for example, reaching for the 
glove compartment to retrieve proof of registration or an insurance 
card, or watching the officer too closely,110 or reaching for a cell 
phone, this action might be viewed by the officer as threatening, and 
the result might be the use of deadly force by the officer.111  This is 
another reason why blacks view police stops with anger and fear.  Ran-
dall Kennedy accurately described the perspective shared by many Af-
rican Americans regarding their encounters with the police: 
     If the police may properly view race as an indicia of 
suspicion, thereby making people of color more vulner-
able to stops and questioning and all that stems from un-
wanted attention from the police, then it follows that 
people of color will have more reason than white persons 
to fear the police, regardless of their compliance with 
law.112 
These feelings of fear and distrust of the police are not merely subjec-
tive or over-reactions to a few isolated encounters between black mo-
torists and the police; numerous studies justify the views of many 
blacks. 
III.  THE NUMBERS TODAY—“DRIVING WHILE BLACK” REMAINS A 
REALITY 
The past is the prologue.  Evidence of arbitrary and discrimina-
tory traffic enforcement is ever present.  “Many studies find that the 
 
 109. Bowers, supra note 15, at 172 & n.206 (quoting TA-NEHISI COATES, 
BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 71 (2015)) (“[T]he policeman who cracks you with a 
nightstick will quickly find his excuse in your furtive movements.”). 
 110. Cf. Bowers, supra note 15, at 185 (quoting video of a traffic stop where an 
officer told the driver that he stopped him “[b]ecause [the driver] made direct eye 
contact” with the officer). 
 111. See also id. at 188 (citation omitted) (“One false move (and a bit of bad 
luck) could describe the boundary between life and death—a killing that might be 
excused, after the fact, as an erroneous but understandable reaction to the officer’s 
reasonable perceptions of danger.”). 
 112. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 153 (1997). 
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police stop African Americans at higher rates than whites.”113  A study 
published in 2014 found that blacks “are 270 percent more likely than 
whites to be subjected to an investigatory stop.”114  The same study 
found that the racial effects of who is stopped “is compounded in what 
happens during the investigatory stop.”115  Police conducting pretext 
stops “are five times more likely to search African Americans than 
whites, but they are much less likely to find a gun or contraband in 
searches of African Americans.”116  In 2018, we continue to see the 
consequences of Whren.  Studies from the Department of Justice, Stan-
ford University, and civil rights organizations indicate that racial dis-
parities in traffic stops remain rampant. 
A. Stanford Open Policing Project 
Researchers at Stanford University set out to analyze racial dis-
parities in police stops across the United States.117  Their study synthe-
sized more than sixty million state patrol stops conducted in twenty 
states between 2011 and 2015.118  Some of the key findings include: 
 
• Black drivers “[were] stopped more often than whites in 
over 80% of the locations” they considered.119 
• “[B]lack drivers have 19% higher odds of receiving a ci-
tation than white drivers,” and that for “typical young 
male drivers” 72% of whites stopped for speeding re-
ceive a citation while 75% of black drivers stopped for 
speeding receive a citation.120 
 
 113. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 52 (citation omitted); id. at 72–73 (“African 
American drivers are more than two and a half times more likely than white drivers 
to be subjected to [pretext] stops.  Gender compounds this disparity in pretext stops:  
African American men are almost four times more likely than white women to be 
subjected to these stops.”). 
 114. Id. at 155. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 156. 
 117. See PIERSON, ET AL., supra note 73. 
 118. Id. at 1. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. Id. at 6. 
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• Black drivers are searched in 3.5% of stops, while white 
drivers are searched in only 2.0% of stops.121 
• Black drivers are more likely than whites to undergo 
consent searches in the seven states where there is data 
available (Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington).  More 
concretely, black drivers have 2.2 times the odds of 
white drivers, and Hispanic drivers have 1.9 times the 
odds of white drivers, of undergoing a consent 
search.122 
• Examining arrests, they found that black drivers are ar-
rested in 2.8% of stops, while white drivers are ar-
rested in 1.7% of stops.123  Put another way, black 
drivers have 1.9 times the odds of being arrested com-
pared to whites.124 
• An “outcome test” revealed that black and white drivers 
who are stopped for traffic-related offenses and subse-
quently searched are both found to have contraband 
28% of the time.  In other words, black and white driv-
ers have comparable “hit rates.”125  However, a 
“threshold test” revealed that even though white and 
black drivers had comparable “hit rates,” black drivers 
are “searched on the basis of less evidence, indicative 
of discrimination.”126  This test revealed that the bar 
for searching black drivers is less than white drivers.  
It found that the threshold for white drivers was 20% 
while the threshold for black drivers was 16%.127 
B. Department of Justice Special Reports 
During the years Barack Obama was president, the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) and its Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) authored 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 7. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 8–9. 
 126. Id. at 9. 
 127. Id. at 11. 
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a number of special reports that set out to discuss discrete issues in 
policing.  Two such reports are relevant to the issue of pretext stops. 
In Police Behavior During Traffic and Street Stops, the DOJ 
and BJS drew from data collected in the BJS 2011 Police-Public Con-
tact Survey.128  The survey synthesized individuals’ involuntary con-
tact with police, namely during traffic stops and street stops.  It also 
examined the individual’s perception of police behavior during the 
stop, as well as the legitimacy of the stop.129  In relevant part, the study 
found that: 
 
• Black drivers (14%) were more likely than white drivers 
(9%) to be told they were being stopped for a records 
check.130 
• Black drivers (4.7%) were nearly two times as likely as 
white drivers (2.6%) to receive no justification for be-
ing stopped.131 
• Black drivers (19%) were more likely than white drivers 
(12.7%) to be told they were being stopped because of 
a vehicle defect.132 
• “White drivers pulled over by police (89%) were more 
likely than black drivers (83%) to think that the police 
behaved properly . . . .”133 
• “Regardless of the reason for the traffic stop, black 
(67%) and Hispanic (74%) drivers were less likely 
than white drivers (84%) to believe the reason for the 
stop was legitimate.”134 
 
 128. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE 
BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 (Morgan Young ed., 2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 1. 
 130. Id. at 4.  Police cannot stop a vehicle to perform a “records check.”  Police 
need probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense or criminal conduct 
before stopping a vehicle.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
 131. LANGTON & DUROSE, supra note 128, at 4.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 3. 
 134. Id. at 4. 
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• “[A] greater percentage of black (7%) and Hispanic 
(6%) drivers were ticketed than white drivers 
(5%).”135 
• Black (6.3%) and Hispanic (6.6%) drivers were more 
likely to be searched by police after being stopped than 
white drivers (2.3%).136 
 
In Police Use of Nonfatal Force, 2002–11, the DOJ and BJS 
revealed that “[t]raffic stops involving an officer and driver of different 
races were significantly more likely to involve the threat or use of force 
(2.0%), compared to traffic stops involving an officer and driver of the 
same race (0.8%).”137  It also found that of police contact made during 
a traffic stop that involved threat or use of force, when the citizen was 
white, threat or use of force was used 0.8% of the time.138  When the 
citizen was black, however, threat or use of force was used 2.5% of the 
time.139  This study also found that in contact involving nonfatal force 
that resulted in a personal search of the individual, “[b]lacks (9.4%) 
were more likely to experience a personal search than whites 
(2.8%).”140 
C. Department of Justice Investigation of the Ferguson, 
Missouri Police Department 
In addition to authoring special reports around discrete issues 
like use of non-lethal force and police behavior during traffic and street 
stops, the DOJ has also, at the request of President Barack Obama, in-
itiated a number of investigations into the patterns and practices of 
large metropolitan police departments.141  These investigations often 
 
 135. Id. at 7. 
 136. Id. at 9. 
 137. SHELLEY HYLAND, LYNN LANGTON, & ELIZABETH DAVIS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POLICE USE OF NONFATAL FORCE, 2002–11, at 8 (Lynne McConnell & Jill 
Thomas eds., 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/punf0211.pdf. 
 138. Id. at 4, tbl.3. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 8. 
 141. According to an NBC News report, “[u]nder the Obama Administration, 
the [Department of Justice] opened 25 investigations into police departments and 
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were prompted by highly-publicized police shootings and killings of 
people of color during the Obama Administration.142  The investiga-
tions were initiated to determine whether police departments were en-
gaging in patterns or practices of unconstitutional conduct and if that 
conduct disproportionately affected communities of color.143 
The most publicized of these investigations was that of Fergu-
son, Missouri:  a city that became a hotbed of racial tension and the 
epicenter of the Black Lives Matter movement following the tragic 
death of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown at the hands of Ferguson 
police officer Darren Wilson.  At its core, the Ferguson investigation 
revealed “discriminatory intent” as a contributing factor to racial dis-
parities in Ferguson’s criminal justice process.144 
The report stated:  “Ferguson police officers from all ranks told 
us that revenue generation is stressed heavily within the police depart-
ment, and that the message comes from City leadership.”145  The report 
also observed that “Ferguson’s police and municipal court practices 
both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stere-
otypes.  Ferguson’s own data establish clear racial disparities that ad-
versely impact African Americans.”146  As a consequence of these of-
ficial priorities and practices, “many [Ferguson police] officers appear 
to see some residents, especially those who live in Ferguson’s predom-
inantly African-American neighborhoods, less as constituents to be 
protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue.”147  The 
Justice Department study made plain that Whren encouraged the police 
practices that afforded the Ferguson police unchecked discretion to 
 
sheriff’s offices and was enforcing 19 [consent] agreements at the end of 2016, re-
solving civil rights lawsuits filed against police departments in Ferguson, Missouri; 
Baltimore, New Orleans, Cleveland and 15 other cities.”  Pete Williams, AG Sessions 
Says DOJ to “Pull Back” on Police Department Civil Right Suits, NBC NEWS (Feb. 
28, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ag-sessions-says-
trump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civil-n726826. 
 142. See id.   
 143. See id.   
 144. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-re-
leases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200528 
2018 1105 MACLIN RECONCILE WLR CLEAN COPY  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  11:13 AM 
2018 Martin Luther King Jr. and Pretext Stops (and Arrests)  129 
stop vehicles and to generate revenue through fines and other court 
costs. 
Some of the key findings from the Ferguson investigation in-
clude: 
 
• “Data collected by the Ferguson Police Department 
[“FPD”] from 2012 to 2014 shows that African Amer-
icans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of cita-
tions, and 93% of arrests made by FPD officers, de-
spite comprising only 67% of Ferguson’s 
population.”148  
• “African Americans are more than twice as likely as 
white drivers to be searched during vehicle stops even 
after controlling for non-race based variables such as 
the reason the vehicle stop was initiated, but are found 
in possession of contraband 26% less often than white 
drivers, suggesting officers are impermissibly consid-
ering race as a factor when determining whether to 
search.”149  
• “African Americans are more likely to be cited and ar-
rested following a stop regardless of why the stop was 
initiated and are more likely to receive multiple cita-
tions during a single incident.  From 2012 to 2014, 
FPD issued four or more citations to African Ameri-
cans on 73 occasions, but issued four or more citations 
to non-African Americans only twice.”150  
 
Investigators and attorneys with the DOJ also collected narra-
tives from citizens.  One narrative depicts how pretextual stops are 
used to harass blacks:  
     In October 2012, police officers pulled over an Afri-
can-American man who had lived in Ferguson for 16 
years, claiming that his passenger-side brake light was 
broken.  The driver happened to have replaced the light 
 
 148. Id. at 4. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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recently and knew it to be functioning properly.  None-
theless, according to the man’s written complaint, one 
officer stated, “let’s see how many tickets you’re going 
to get,” while a second officer tapped his Electronic Con-
trol Weapon (“ECW”) on the roof of the man’s car.  The 
officers wrote the man a citation for “tail light/reflec-
tor/license plate light out.”  They refused to let the man 
show them that his car’s equipment was in order, warn-
ing him, “don’t you get out of that car until you get to 
your house.”151  
Ultimately, the DOJ report on the Ferguson Police Department 
depicted an organization that employs discriminatory and arbitrary 
procedures and practices aimed at African Americans living and work-
ing in Ferguson.  The report describes “a pattern of [police] stops with-
out reasonable suspicion and arrests without probable cause in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment; infringement on free expression, as 
well as retaliation for protected expression, in violation of the First 
Amendment; and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”152  
A year after the DOJ report was issued, the DOJ and the City of 
Ferguson entered into a consent decree regarding many of the findings 
listed in the DOJ report.153  The consent decree was “meant to ensure 
protection of the constitutional and other legal rights of all members of 
the community, improve Ferguson’s ability to effectively prevent 
crime, enhance both officer and public safety, and increase public con-
fidence in the Ferguson Police Department.”154 
Interestingly, to protect the “constitutional” rights of persons 
living and working in Ferguson, the consent decree bars Ferguson po-
lice officers from employing pretext stops.155  Think about this propo-
 
 151. Id. at 17. 
 152. Id. at 2–3. 
 153. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180-
CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016). 
 154. Id. at 1. 
 155. Id. at 19 (“FPD officers will not initiate an encounter with any person or 
stop any person, or attempt to do so, for the purpose of checking for warrants even 
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sition:  to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks living in Fer-
guson, the federal government required that Ferguson police officers 
refrain from exercising police authority—pretextual traffic stops—that 
a unanimous Supreme Court had ruled was constitutional.  Put another 
way:  
In order to try to prevent the Ferguson police from treat-
ing African American residents unfairly, the police de-
partment’s constitutional powers have to be curtailed.  
Not only is the Constitution, as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, insufficient to protect black people from 
police abuse, it actually aids and abets the police abus-
ers.156  
The aftermath of the DOJ report and the resulting consent decree un-
flinchingly demonstrates how Whren fosters arbitrary and discrimina-




The above statistics and reports demonstrate the breadth of the 
problem associated with pretext stops.  But these studies cannot expose 
the human judgments that are responsible for the consequences and 
racial disparities caused by pretext stops.  First, it is important to note 
that pretext stops are not always initiated by racist law enforcement 
officials or even individual officers.  James Forman Jr.’s insightful 
book, Locking Up Our Own, describes how Eric Holder, the nation’s 
first African American Attorney General, helped initiate Operation 
Ceasefire when he served as the first black United States Attorney for 
the District of Columbia in the early 1990s.157 
The point of Operation Ceasefire was basic:  “Stop cars, search 
cars, seize guns.”158  Specially trained units of the District of Columbia 
police department would patrol high-crime areas of the city looking for 
 
where there is an alternative pretext for the stop, unless the officer knows the person’s 
identity and that the person has outstanding warrants for his/her arrest, prior to the 
encounter.”); id. at 20 (“FPD officers will not conduct pretextual stops except where 
the actual reason for the stop is to investigate a felony.”). 
 156. BUTLER, supra note 76, at 190. 
 157. FORMAN, supra note 98, at 194–211. 
 158. Id. at 197. 
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suspicious vehicles with the goal of searching for guns inside the 
cars.159  Any traffic offense would justify a stop and the officers would 
take it from there.  Holder conceded the impact on the black commu-
nity:  “I’m not going to be naïve about it . . . .  The people who will be 
stopped will be young black males, overwhelmingly.”160  The costs 
were worth it, however, to protect blacks from gun violence.  Holder 
was not alone in embracing pretext stops as a way of reducing crime 
in poor black neighborhoods.  “Holder’s approach was embraced by 
the black police chiefs who were running departments in several major 
cities by the late 1990s.”161  
But Holder did not acknowledge “the immense volume of inno-
cent people who would have to be stopped in order to obtain a sizeable 
number of guns.”162  Holder and others who supported pretext stops in 
the District of Columbia should have known that such stops would 
rarely disclose guns; Holder’s proposal was based in part on similar 
programs in Kansas City, Missouri, and Indianapolis, Indiana.  The 
“Kansas City and Indianapolis studies showed how seldom guns were 
actually found.  In Kansas City, police in the target area seized guns in 
only 3.57 percent of traffic stops, while in Indianapolis they found 
guns in less than 1 percent of traffic stops.”163  Most importantly, when 
unveiling his proposal, Holder did not discuss the inevitable resent-
ment felt by innocent persons who would become the eventual subjects 
of pretext stops.  
It is also important to understand that a pretext stop “is an insti-
tutionalized practice.”164  Deploying pretext stops to search for guns, 
as was done in the District of Columbia under Eric Holder’s watch, or 
to look for drugs, as the New Jersey State Police did in the mid-1990s, 
are well-considered policy choices.  Moreover, as one study has 
shown, “[p]olicies favoring proactive investigatory stops, by directing 
 
 159. Nancy Lewis, Holder Says Gun Campaign Will Enlist 50 D.C. Officers; 
U.S. Attorney to be Host of Summit this Week, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at D1. 
 160. FORMAN, supra note 98, at 203. 
 161. Id. at 204 (noting that Bernard Parks, the black police chief in Los Ange-
les, and Charles Ramsey, who became the police chief in the District of Columbia in 
1998, shared Holder’s view). 
 162. Id. at 200.  
 163. Id. at 201 (citation omitted). 
 164. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.  
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officers to look not for violations of the law but suspicious individuals, 
activate departments’ and officers’ implicit stereotypes of which 
neighborhoods and which individuals are suspicious.”165  These policy 
choices have consequences, some of which are extremely harmful.166  
To confiscate a single illegal weapon, dozens of innocent motorists 
must be stopped, questioned, and sometimes have their vehicles 
searched while they are left standing on the side of the road to watch 
police rifle through their possessions.  In urban areas, the innocent per-
sons most affected are black males, and they deeply resent the experi-
ence.167  
Finally, high-ranking police officials and prosecutors are mis-
guided when they dismiss the resentment felt by innocent persons as 
“victimology.”168  In our racially polarized nation, the consequences 
of pretext stops are vital.  “Police stops convey powerful messages 
about citizenship and equality.  Across millions of stops, these experi-
ences are translated into common stories about who is an equal mem-
ber of a rule-governed society and who is subjected to arbitrary sur-
veillance and inquiry.”169  Law enforcement officials should heed the 
advice of James Forman Jr. who observes that “pretext stops are a di-
rect, easily remedied source of racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system, and they are entirely within the power of law enforcement to 
correct.”170 
 
 165. Id. at 50.  
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 73–94. 
 167. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 1–3.   
 168. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/magazine/the-color-of-suspicion.html. (quot-
ing D.C. Police Chief’s reaction to claims of racial profiling by the police:  “‘Not to 
say that it doesn’t happen, but it’s clearly not as serious or widespread as the publicity 
suggests,’ says Chief Charles Ramsey of Washington.  ‘I get so tired of hearing that 
“Driving While Black” stuff.  It’s just used to the point where it has no meaning.  I 
drive while black—I’m black.  I sleep while black too.  It’s victimology.  Black people 
commit traffic violations.  What are we supposed to say?  People get a free pass be-
cause they’re black?’”).[JH: since there are no pincites for newspapers, I do not think 
you need a cite and then an id to have the quote] 
 169. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 2; id. at 113 (“African Americans are sub-
jected to deeper investigatory intrusions not because they are poorer, less educated, 
more disrespectful, or more distrustful of the police than whites.  It is a racial dispar-
ity, pure and simple.”).  
 170. FORMAN, supra note 98, at 214 (citation omitted). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The authors in this symposium were asked to consider how far 
America has come in the fifty years after the tragic assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr.  Of course, America has made substantial pro-
gress on several fronts that would have pleased Dr. King had he lived 
to see them.  Many aspects of our criminal justice system, however, 
would have deeply disappointed King.  We are confident that the con-
tinued and widespread use of pretext stops and their attended conse-
quences would have offended King.  Looking forward, America can 
honor Dr. King by ending pretext stops. 
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